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Overview of the Presentation
Research problem
Hash functions and hash based MACs
SCA attacks and our model to analyse hash based MACs
DPA of recently proposed hash based MACs
Summary and open questions
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Research Problem.
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Motivation
Background
Cryptanalysis of standard hash functions (MD5 & SHA-1)
Generic attacks on the Merkle-Damgård structure
Necessity for new hashing methods
AHS competition of NIST to augment FIPS 180-2 secure hash
standard (SHS)
The new SHS will be SHA-3 family.
Requirement of a hash submission to the AHS competition
Support for the FIPS applications (FIPS 198 HMAC)
Consideration of side channel attacks (SCA) on the hash based MACs
1. Resistance to SCA for HMAC configuration
2. Resistance to SCA for other MAC configurations
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Research Problem
Hypothesis
New hash and compression function modes as SHA-3 candidates
Compression function modes could be based on block ciphers (PGV)
SHA-3 requirement
Hash modes should define either a HMAC or a dedicated MAC mode
Any MAC mode should have protection from the SCA attacks
Research questions
Security of recent hash and compression function modes in the HMAC
setting against SCA?
Security of recently proposed alternatives to HMAC against SCA?
How such an analysis can contribute to the AHS competition?
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Our approach
Classify to be analysed MACs into two categories
Type-1:Provably secure MAC alternatives to NMAC/HMAC
Examples: BNMAC, KMDP, EMD MAC, Multi-lane NMAC and
O-NMAC
Type-2: HMAC/NMAC configuration of the compression and hash
modes
Examples: MDC2, Grindahl, MAME and Wide-pipe hash
MAC schemes with no hash analysis
Examples: BNMAC, O-NMAC
DPA attack model assumes that the block cipher is DPA resistant
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Hash functions and hash based MACs
20 October 2008 – p. 7
Hash Functions
H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}n, H(M) = Y
Merkle-Damgård iterative structure
Popular hashes: MD4, MD5, SHA-0/1, SHA-224/256 and SHA-384/512
m1 m2 m3
H1 H2 H3 HL−1
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MAC Algorithms
Verify the integrity and authenticity of the information
Secure MAC: Hard to find a new (m, MAC(m)) pair even after seeing a
few of them
Attacks include forgery and key-recovery
Forgeries
Universal
Selective
Existential
HMAC is FIPS PUB 198 standard
P
A
D
k ⊕ ipad m1 mL k ⊕ opad
fffffIV HMACk(m)
NMAC is a variant of HMAC.
20 October 2008 – p. 9
SCA attacks and our model
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Side Channel Attacks
Serious threat to the computing devices that often use secret-key algorithms
Side channel information is linked with the secret key
Correlate physical measurements and computing time with the internal state
correlated to the secret key
Reveal secret internal state or the key itself
CPU
SECRET
Measure
Input Output
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DPA attack model
x
y z(secret and fixed)
(public and variable)
DPA attack:
1. Guess some bit of y
2. Classify x into two groups.
(a) Group 1: target bit of z = 1
(b) Group 0: target bit of z = 0
3. Measure the output power signal for each group
4. Compute average power signal for each group and measure their
difference
5. Use DPA bias signal to verify the guess of y
6. Repeat (1)-(5) to recover y
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Reverse DPA attack model
x
y z(secret and fixed) (public and variable)
RDPA attack:
1. Guess some bit of y
2. Measure the power signal
3. Retrieve and classify z into two groups
(a) Group 1: target bit of x = 1
(b) Group 0: target bit of x = 0
4. Compute average power signal for each group and measure their
difference
5. Use DPA bias signal to verify the guess of y
6. Repeat (1)-(5) to recover y
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DPA analysis of recently proposed hash based MACs
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DPA attack on BNMAC
m2
m1
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m2L−1
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f fff
HL
Mount DPA attack on Hi ⊕m2i+1(or k2 ⊕m1) and recover k2
Padding procedure in BNMAC does not depend on the message length
Recovery of k1 depends on the architecture of f
k2 is enough to forge BNMAC:
1. Ask BNMAC tag for m = m1‖m2‖ . . . ‖m2L−1‖m2L
2. Set m∗3 = H1 ⊕ (m1 ⊕ k2) and m∗4 = m2
3. Set m∗ = m1‖m2‖m∗3‖m∗4 . . . ‖m2L−1‖m2L
4. BNMACk1,k2(m) = BNMACk1,k2(m∗)
20 October 2008 – p. 15
KMDP using PGV schemes
k
m1 m2
P
mL−1 mL
H1 H2
f fff
HL
Security against DPA attacks is almost similar to that of NMAC/HMAC
RDPA attack on KMDP based on Davies-Meyer:
E Ekk
m1
m1
m2
m2
H1 H1
H2
H2
PP f
f
1. Mount RDPA on P (H1)⊕Em2(P (H1)) = H2 using N2 of m1‖m2
and recover N values of P (H1) and then H1
2. Mount RDPA on k ⊕Em1(k) = H1 using N of H1 to recover k
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Grindahl and MDC2 compression functions
Hi−1‖mi HiP T
No target XOR operation when P is ideal
SCA resistant when P is ideal
MDC2 which uses Matyas-Meyer-Oseas also does not expose any target
XOR operation
EHi−1
mi
Hi
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Summary of results
MAC function Matyas-Meyer-Oseas Miyaguchi-Preneel Davies-Meyer
BNMAC PK(EF) CK(UF) CK(UF)
EMD N/A N/A PK(NG)
KMDP NO NO CK(UF)
Multi-lane NMAC N/A N/A PK(NG)
O-NMAC NO NO NO
NMAC NO NO PK(NG)
Wide-pipe hash in the HMAC mode has the same DPA security as HMAC
MAME compression function in the HMAC mode is DPA resistant
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Open questions
20 October 2008 – p. 19
Open questions
How to design a block cipher based multi-property preserving hash
construction which is also a SCA resistant when it is instantiated with any
of the secure PGV schemes
Design of a provably secure MAC construction using HAIFA and
double-pipe hash invoked with secure PGV schemes and their analysis w.r.t
SCA attacks
What type of alternatives to MD can be plugged into NMAC/HMAC?
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